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Abstract
Understanding how management and functional teams perceive risk, 
and will decide and act in managing risk, is one cornerstone of an effective 
enterprise Information Security management strategy. There is evidence in the 
literature that if managers do not understand the reasons behind an Information 
Security policy, or do not fully support the rationale behind the strategy, they are 
unlikely to engage in its development or adhere to it later.  Further, if various 
individuals and management teams in an organisation approach risk 
management in a non-aligned fashion, their divergent decisions and actions 
could have the effect of canceling out each other, and rendering the enterprise 
risk management strategy less effective. Research indicates that a sociological 
understanding of risk perception as an input to Information Security 
development is becoming a necessity. We argue this from two strands of 
literature: the first is the literature in risk assessment in fields other than 
Information Security. The second strand is the Information Security literature. 
How do managers perceive risk in practice? And how might an 
enterprise foster an aligned approach to risk management?  This paper 
presents the case of LeCroy Corp., a medium size manufacturer of high value 
electronic testing equipment. We show that whilst there are areas where 
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perceptions toward, and tolerance of, risk are shared within the organization, 
there are substantial variations between different groups of managers at 
LeCroy.   Groups which routinely work together on information security and risk 
management related tasks have lower standard deviations in their risk 
judgments than teams which do not share this working experience, an 
indication that risk perception alignment is in part a social process.  Yet this 
second group may also have responsibilities that are critical to enterprise risk 
management.  We also find that top executives are “mathematical” in their risk 
appetite at low and medium stakes, yet highly risk averse when the stakes are 
higher, such as complete business success or failure, another indication of a 
social aspect to risk perception and management. The ideal scenario for 
degree and type of alignment will vary as a function of the type of working team.  
This case study illustrates one approach for defining and migrating toward a 
robust enterprise risk culture.
Keywords: Social Aspects of Information Security, Alignment, Case 
Study, Risk Management.
Introduction 
Individuals in a population display variation in their tolerance for risk.  A 
retired widower for example might choose an investment known to offer lower 
returns than other investments available, because it also presented a lower 
likelihood of variations in return.   A young entrepreneur on the other hand, 
might be willing to accept a higher probability of surprises, as long as she feels 
the upside is commensurate with the downside.  Willingness to accept a 
reduction in return, in order to reduce expected variation in return, is defined 
here as intolerance to risk.  Willingness to accept high expected variation in 
return in order to maximize expected returns, is defined here as tolerance for 
risk. These are scalar concepts and can be reduced to the question (for 
intolerance) “how much would you be willing to spend, to reduce uncertainty in 
a specific context?”  Alternatively phrased (for tolerance), it becomes “how 
much spending do you wish to withhold given your appetite for risk in this 
specific context?”  Developing a clear and aligned Information Security policy 
requires making these concepts vector, by adding a context dimension.  An 
individual may be highly tolerant, for example, to the risk of loss of ERP data, yet 
highly averse to the risk of impairment of a patent.  A good understanding of 
both intolerance and tolerance to risk will therefore be an essential component 
of any successful Information Security policy. 
Sources of information security risk are usually documented in 
taxonomies of risks. They tend to list broad categories of risk sources 
(Backhouse and Dhillon, 1996) that can be used to ensure that all sources of 
potential risks have been surveyed. For instance Loch et al. (1992) classify 
sources of information security risks as internal versus external, human versus 
non-human and accidental versus intentional. Similar classifications exist in the 
ISO 27001 control objectives (ISO, 2005) and in most text relating to 
Information Security (see for instance Whitman and Mattord, 2003).
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Such taxonomies and classifications have been criticized by Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2001). They remark that checklists and taxonomies of threat tend 
to leave out the social nature of information security problems. This makes it 
difficult to get a clear picture of management's appetite for risk as an input to the 
Information Security strategy, and subsequently to ensure that the 
expectations and actions of various stakeholders are aligned. Yet, recent 
research suggests that understanding an organization's appetite for risk (and 
subsequently ensuring a good alignment between the stakeholders' attitudes to 
risk, and actual risk management practice) is perhaps as important to the 
success of an Information Security policy as is understanding risks clearly 
(Ashenden and Ezingeard 2005, Ezingeard et al., 2004). This is now 
understood in professional standards. COBIT 4.0 (ITGI, 2005) for instance 
firmly reinforces the need to understand an enterprise's appetite for risk as part 
of the information technology (IT) risk management process. 
How then, can we measure (or estimate) the appetite for risk of an 
organization and use this estimate as an input to an Information Security 
strategy? Further, how can we ensure a good degree of alignment of attitudes 
to risk across an organization? Through a study of the risk appetite at a 
manufacturer of electronic testing equipment, this paper investigates the 
underlying dimensions of risk appetite pertaining to Information Security, and 
business continuity in general.   
We begin with a review of the literature around risk management and 
alignment and linkages to social processes and risk perceptions and culture.   
We then present our case protocol and framework, and research methodology.  
This lays the groundwork for our case findings, after which we present a 
summary of what we believe this work has contributed, and suggest possible 
lines for further inquiry.  This is followed by our conclusions. 
Conceptual Basis: Risk Management and Alignment
Alignment
The notion of alignment is crucial in many areas of business. It has its 
origins in the concept of strategic fit, popularised by Tom Peters in the 1980s, 
who argued that congruence among seven elements  strategy, structure, 
systems, style, staff, shared values and skills  is necessary for success (Peters 
and Waterman, 1982). Alignment (also described as strategic fit) is important, 
because it leads to superior performance (Gietzmann and Selby, 1994, p19).
Defining “fit” is, however, difficult as fit goes beyond knowing what needs 
to be aligned, to include how alignment should be achieved.  This led 
Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) to define fit as process (how to achieve fit) 
and content (what fit looks like).  The importance of process is also highlighted 
by Reich and Bensabat (1996) who argue that two aspects need to be 
considered. As Venkatraman and Camillus, they highlight the importance of 
understanding how the planning process itself can help achieve alignment (in 
the case of Enterprise Risk Management, this would involve an examination of 
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the Enterprise Risk Strategy). They however take this further by suggesting the 
importance of looking at social relationships in the organisation. 
The idea behind the argument that social relationships need to be 
looked at is that alignment is not only a strategic, logical process but also a 
social process. Therefore, communication between executive management 
and each  function to be aligned (for instance IT executives) is often quoted as 
necessary for alignment (Reich and Benbasat, 1996, Reich and Benbasat, 
2000). Alignment is also thought to be easier to achieve if business executives 
have a good knowledge of the functional areas where alignment is sought 
(Hussin et al., 2002).  
The first link between strategic processes and social processes: 
risk perceptions
For almost two decades now, Information Security has been 
implemented as a process in many organizations. It follows a sequence of risk 
identification, risk classification (for instance in terms of impact and probability) 
and risk mitigation or avoidance. The approach has been at the basis of some of 
the most common Information Security best practice approaches such as the 
ISO 27000 series (ISO, 2005) at a management system level, as well as the 
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS, 2005) at a lower 
technical level, since their inceptions. Whilst treating Information Security as a 
process is now seen as good practice, there have been many calls to ensure 
that the process should not be treated solely as a mechanistic one and should 
be capable of continuously adapting to its context. This approach is very 
“functionalist” (McFadzean et al., 2004) and can easily be seen as lacking 
completeness because its comprehension of the context of risk is limited. For 
instance both Beck (1992) and Baskerville (1991) argue that much work on risk 
analysis for Information Security is too functionalist.  They suggest that 
practitioners have become over-reliant on predictive models for developing a 
secure information system thus ignoring important issues such as employee 
understanding, motivation and behaviour.
Adams (2005) outlines three types of risk: those that are perceived 
directly, those that are perceived through science, and virtual risk. He suggests 
that risks that are perceived directly are dealt with using judgement (this refers 
to risks such as crossing the road, for example).  Virtual risks are culturally 
constructed because science is inconclusive which means that “whom we 
believe depends on whom we trust”.  Those risks that are perceived through 
science are relatively objective in nature.  Information security risk assessment 
has come from a scientific background and has worked on the assumption that 
information security risks can be perceived through hard science.  It now 
seems the case that many of the facets of Information Security fall into the 
category of virtual risk and if we are to address them from this perspective then 
we need a better understanding of how they are culturally constructed. There is 
therefore a need to “understand the relationships between human factors and 
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risk and trust if a relatively secure cyberspace is to develop in the future” (OST, 
2004).
A third reason why understanding how risk is perceived is important is 
the social complexity of risk itself.  Willcocks and Margetts (1994) point out that 
recent research, “supports generally the finding that the major risks and 
reasons for failure tend to be through organizational, social and political, rather 
than technical factors”.  Although this is referring to risk in the broad information 
system environment rather than Information Security specifically, the same 
assertion still applies.  They go on to recommend that risk should be assessed 
as “a result of distinctive human and organizational practices and patterns of 
belief and action”. 
The second link between strategic processes and social processes: 
risk culture
Information Security risk is only one category of risks organizations are 
exposed to and many organizations find it difficult to align their IT risk 
management efforts with those of the rest of the organization in other areas 
such as financial or business continuity risks (Birchall et al., 2004). Often this is 
because risk management strategies, and more specifically Information 
Security strategies, are not grounded in organizational values (Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh, 2006). Yet, legislative and regulatory requirements  for instance in 
the corporate governance arena, requiring organizations to think of Information 
Security within their overall risk management frameworks (ITGI, 2003)  make 
this a requirement. This means that not only do risk management processes 
need to be aligned across functional areas in the organization, but also that 
attitudes towards risk need to be aligned. 
In order to address this need for alignment, Jahner and Kcrmar (2005) 
propose a model of risk culture. The model has three dimensions, namely 
Identify, Communicate and Act. Whilst the “Identify” and “Act” dimensions are 
often clearly embedded in many Information Security processes, Jahner and 
Kcrmar argue that an organization's Information Security efforts can only be 
successful if a shared understanding of possible threats is achieved and if a 
shared understanding of how to act consistently is reached. How people act in 
Risk Management is, according to Ciborra (2004)“intertwined in social 
processes and networks of relationships”. 
Whilst Jahner and Kcrmar's model of risk culture is useful as a basis for 
understanding the social processes around risk in an organization, it does not 
discuss the importance of a shared understanding of the risk/reward equation 
in any of its three phases. Yet, this is likely to be crucial to the success of any risk 
management process. Whilst the information systems (IS) risk management 
literature is often coy about making this explicit, the purpose of risk 
management is not solely the avoidance of risk to minimise losses, but in fact 
the need to take risks to reap rewards. The financial risk management 
community is of course more explicit about this since the risk/reward equation is 
one of the fundamental rules of business. As pointed out in the Turnbull report 
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“Since profits are, in part, the reward for successful risk-taking in business, the 
purpose of internal control is to help manage and control risk appropriately 
rather than to eliminate it” (Turnbull, 1999). 
There is a growing body of literature that suggests that this risk-reward 
equation is an integral part of an organization's risk culture. For instance, 
according to Adams and Thompson (2002), the assessment of reward is a key 
aspect of the “risk thermostat” that is at play both at an institutional and 
individual level during Risk Assessment. In Adams' model, the “risk thermostat” 
includes perceptual filters (Adams, 1999) whose influence depends on the 
attitude of people to risk. Similarly, attitude to risks have been found to have a 
significant impact of the way Boards of Directors address information security 
in their organisation (Ezingeard et al., 2003). We therefore need to augment 
Jahner and Kcrmar's model of risk culture by adding assessment of reward and 
assessment of the risk/reward equation in the “identify” and “communicate” 
dimensions of risk culture.
Case protocol
The method we used for the case study presented below is based on the 
three aspects of alignment we have explored so far: Context, Content and 
Process. This gave us one dimension of the exploration framework. In order to 
help us explain context we chose to look at the competitive environment in 
which the organisation operates in detail. This was done at a high level of detail 
in so far as the business area is a niche one, characterised by complex 
products and few competitors. More specifically we looked at the influence of 
three key stakeholders on the Enterprise risk strategy: Customers, Employees 
and Investors.
The second dimension was provided by looking at the make up of 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), starting with plans and actions as well as 
the two conceptual links we discussed earlier, namely the need to understand 
how risk perceptions and risk culture influence the alignment between ERM 
and business strategy. The resulting case study framework is shown in Table 1. 
ERM Plans and Actions Risk Perception Risk Culture
Context How the business context How the business context How the business context
influences ERM. influences risk perceptions influences risk culture in
in the organisation. the organisation.
Content What are the ERM How risk perceptions influence How the risk culture   
mechanisms in place? the ERM mechanisms in place influences ERM mechanisms
(and vice versa). (and vice versa).
Process What are the processes in How risk perceptions impact on How risk culture impacts on 
place to achieve and maintain the alignment process. the alignment process.
alignment between business 
strategy and ERM?
Table 1: Case framework
Data was collected in three ways. The second author of this paper is a 
member of the executive team of the organisation and this enabled us to base 
most of the observations in this paper on his experience. Secondly the case 
was informed by documentary evidence, relying on the examination of:
o Policies
o Risk Management Spreadsheets
o Audit reports and audit recommendations
Lastly, we collected quantitative questionnaire data from a yearly risk 
profiling survey of employees and the executive team of the company. This data 
helped us gain an understanding of risk perceptions in vector, quantified form. 
Examples of questionnaire results are presented later.
Case study
Company background
LeCroy Corp. (Nasdaq  LCRY, FY2005 Sales $US165M) was founded 
by Walter O. LeCroy in 1964 in Irvington, New York, USA. It operates in the Test 
and Measurement business, with the tag line “Innovators in Instrumentation”. 
This illustrates a dilemma in so far as the business area the company works in is 
one where products must be trustworthy, and innovation must therefore not get 
in the way of an equally important reputation for stability and robustness. 
Consequently, whilst innovations are required and can be significant source of 
competitive advantage, they cannot be allowed to be synonymous with 
surprises for the customer.  Thus instrumentation makers tend to test 
innovations heavily before introducing them into production.  They are 
generally willing to spend heavily to avoid surprises. We can therefore, from the 
outset, categorise the organisation's strategic environment as “risk intolerant”.
LeCroy's  products are software intensive. Most are designed to be 
used connected to local area networks. It is therefore important that they should 
be patchable and upgradeable easily. When LeCroy's products began to be 
designed with embedded x86 architecture processors running Windows™ 
operating systems, a rigorous information security regimen became a 
requirement (Hirsch, 2005), in order to prevent malware contagion incidents 
that could affect the company, and possibly thereafter its customers (Oshri et 
al., 2005).  At that time, the CEO chartered a new change initiative to elevate 
the information security culture.  Two years later, when the Security Team had 
taken solid hold and the information security culture had clearly moved solidly in 
the desired direction, the CEO further chartered a new supplemental change 
initiative to institute Enterprise Risk Management at LeCroy.  This is viewed as 
a completing element of the information security project.
LeCroy's main competitors are two, much larger, public companies.  
Instrumentation design and production is a high fixed cost business, hence 
there is a substantial advantage conferred by size.  LeCroy must compete with 
these larger companies for relationships with customers, employees and 
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investors. LeCroy therefore has a strategy of fostering longer than average 
relationships with its partners in each of the above three communities.  “No 
Surprises” is an element of the strategy.
Context
The first aspect we investigated of LeCroy's information security and 
risk management programme is how it is influenced by its environment and 
business area. In particular we investigated how its policies and procedures are 
designed to enable enterprise management of risk, such that customers, 
employees and owners experience a coherent risk profile. The key influences 
we uncovered are represented in Table 2. 
Influence of context on perceptions of risk (and risk tolerance)
The context LeCroy operates in recognizes “controllable risks” as those 
for which the probability of occurrence can be viably decreased or increased 
based on management's decisions to invest or withhold investment in 
mitigation strategies.  Examples of such risk could be data loss or data 
corruption risk. Conversely, “uncontrollable risks” are those for which the 
probability of occurrence cannot be changed by management action. 
Examples of such risk would be the arrival of an Avian Flu pandemic.
It is clear that most managers at LeCroy are intolerant of controllable 
risks.  On the other hand, most managers seem very comfortable to operate in 
a business environment and context where they know many risks are 
uncontrollable and only their consequences can be mitigated. For example, 
instrumentation makers must be (at least) one step ahead of their customers in 
terms of technology.  If an oscilloscope is going to help a designer working on a 
10 Gbit design, the oscilloscope itself must be significantly faster internally.  
Design activities therefore carry significant risk.  Which technologies to “bet 
on”?  Which vendors can supply the needed components within the tight 
specifications required? One chipset (processor, memory) may offer a longer 
period of stability while another may introduce the latest feature … which 
chipsets should be selected? Which development project is likely to succeed, 
and which is likely to fail?
Influence of context on risk culture
LeCroy's early years were spent in the high-energy physics 
instrumentation market.  This market had two main participant segments: 
academia and military.  From an information security and risk management 
perspective, these segments presented a dichotomy.  The bias for information 
sharing, typical of the “un-caged information” culture of the University, stood in 
stark contrast to the “need-to-know” information culture of the military and 
national research labs.  For this reason, the information security culture at 
LeCroy is nuanced and complex.  Traditionally the collegial atmosphere at 
LeCroy had been characteristic of a relaxed information security culture with a 
bias toward knowledge management benefits obtained through easy and 
widespread access to information.   
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Customers Employees        Owners
Context o Long warranties and o Employee benefits Expanding number of
   product support; offerings are designed  institutional 
. o Easy and cheap to reduce  risks for   shareholders.
  software upgrades; employees;
o Minimized risk of  o Relatively comprehensive 
  malware contagion. insurance coverage and 
support packages; 
o Facilities investments and 
procedures designed to help 
employees manage risk;  
o Health and safety policy 
based on halving exposure 
every year.
Implications Low tolerance of risks Low tolerance of risks that High tolerance of t 
that could influence could influence employee marke risks;
customer relationships; relationships; Management's strategy 
Decision to implement Risks to health and safety is to aggressively 
ISO9000, receiving the on the job are managed mitigate controllable 
first certification issued in a different paradigm risks, while  managing  
under the ISO9000:2000 than  information security the consequences  of
program; risks.  unavoidable risk.
Information security  
policy is significantly 
influenced by the high 
software  content of 
products.  
Key Higher than typical values Average length of service 8.2% of total shares 
Performance for customer retention at LeCroy is 8 years, outstanding are held by 
Indicators and repurchase. double peer group institutional holders 
average. with  at least 4 
quarters of ownership.
Table 2: Key stakeholder influences
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Content of the risk management framework
The company bases its enterprise risk management methodology on a 
cycle of measurement and education. A significant element of the risk 
management framework is data driven  with the overarching philosophy that 
employees and managers are responsible, and empowered, to align their risk 
management decisions to the company risk management strategy, and only 
require data and understanding in order to carry this out.
A risk management team comprising executives, managers and 
employees has been formed and charged with developing and implementing 
an enterprise risk management program. The program differentiates between 
those risks for which a return on investment (ROI) figure can be calculated 
should the company decide to mitigate the risk, and those risks for an ROI basis 
for investment decision making would be inappropriate (for instance employee 
discomfort, health and safety).
For those risks where a mitigation ROI can be calculated, LeCroy uses a 
spreadsheet with key columns labelled as shown in Table 3. Each of these 
factors figures into an algebraic expression, whose value indicates an 
estimated ROI on mitigation, and a confidence level in the estimate. The 
spreadsheet gives management a first indication of which mitigation decisions 
to consider, based on expectation of financial return.  This is well aligned to the 
company's “willingness to spend to reduce uncertainty” model of risk 
management.
Table 4: Headings of the non-quantifiable risks spreadsheet
Influence of risk perceptions on the risk management framework
As explained earlier, the basis of the risk management framework is 
numerical. This means that perceptions of probability, severity, and 
seriousness of threat as well as costs to mitigate inevitably influence the 
robustness of the framework and its ability to deliver strategic objectives. For 
instance, we asked members of the Company's executive team how much they 
would be prepared to spend to halve the probability of:
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o 2 day building closure
o The loss of 2 days of BaaN (ERP) data
o Bodily injury to 2 employees
o The 2 most important LeCroy patents become invalidated
o A large bin of confidential documents intended for shredding is 
accidentally released into the insecure dumpster
o The website being attacked and defaced for 2 days
o A malware infestation of the network and 200 infected products are 
shipped to customers
The responses we got varied significantly. Interestingly no significant 
pattern seemed to emerge based on the function of the respondent. When 
pressed for an explanation it became apparent that the perceived severity, 
rather than the perceived likelihood, of such events was the cause of the 
variation.  The loss of two days of ERP data, for example, implied vastly 
different levels of pain to various respondents.
Influence of the risk culture on the risk management framework
We have so far characterised the company's risk culture as one that 
prefers to give priority to knowledge sharing and collegiality, and one that 
historically had a “relaxed” attitude towards Information Security. Yet, we have 
also described how the “risk thermostats” are set fairly low for controllable risks, 
and higher for uncontrollable risks. The need to resolve this apparent tension 
influences the risk management framework at two levels:
o Risk management structures: A high profile is given to risk management, 
with two committees (the Information Security Team and the Risk 
Management Team) dealing with risk company-wide. These teams 
meet regularly. The Chief Information Officer sits on both teams. The 
teams regularly seek (and get) input from members of the Company's 
executive team and annually from the Board. 
o A strong sense that the company's efforts towards risk avoidance were 
made necessary by the market, and are appropriate. This is illustrated 
for instance by the views of the sales force about whether LeCroy should 
be more risk tolerant than it is. Out of 7 senior sales employees we 
questioned, only 1 thought LeCroy should be more risk tolerant, yet 3 
described the company's culture as risk intolerant. Similarly, only one 
member of the executive team thought that LeCroy should be more risk 
tolerant.
Formal Alignment process 
It is assumed that each manager or employee, who was hired for their 
job expertise, is the most capable person to estimate the probability and 
consequences of unexpected outcomes in their area of activity (first two 
columns of the spreadsheet tool).  However, attention is paid to the alignment 
Hirsch, Ezingeard JISSec 13
between the risk-management actions of individual managers and the 
company's desired risk profile. For information risks, generally viewed as not 
employee health or safety related, assessments are made of likelihood of an 
unexpected outcome during the coming fiscal year, and of the expected cost 
should such an event occur.  Whenever possible this is done based on LeCroy 
or peer company data. Then alternative mitigation actions/strategies are listed, 
as are the extent of estimated mitigation for each.  Costs are listed as well, and 
from these factors an estimated ROI can be computed.  In general, for 
information related risks, mitigation strategies are selected using this method, 
and applied to the current year's hurdle rate. The first alignment mechanism is 
therefore project finance.
The second routine alignment process in place in the Company is the 
participation of the Chief Information Officer in three key forums with a 
significant stake in the Company's ERM: The Information Security Team, the 
Risk Management Team and the Executive Team. This is seen to be an 
effective alignment mechanism in so far as both the Information Security Team 
and the Risk Management team are responsible for overseeing all planning 
related to ERM.
This is supplemented by two other mechanisms, which whilst not 
designed with the sole purpose of alignment in mind are widely seen in the 
organisation as important vehicles for validating the alignment of the ERM 
strategy. The first such mechanism consists of formal and regular Board 
agenda items where the ERM strategy and its Information Security 
components are discussed. The second such mechanism is company-wide 
(driven by IS and Finance) participation in debates and preparations for risk 
related audits (ISO, Sarbanes-Oxley).
The company does not generally screen recruitment candidates using 
risk-tolerance filters.  The company therefore expects its employees and 
managers, in the absence of an enterprise risk management program, would 
represent a spectrum of individual risk cultures similar to the general population 
at large from which these groups are drawn. Therefore the company seeks to 
define actively and communicate vocabulary, concepts, and methods in its risk 
management program, which will allow functions as diverse as Sales, 
Facilities, Marketing, Production, Logistics, Finance, and Engineering, to 
achieve alignment in their approach to their diverse risk management tasks.  
These functions also need to be able to adjust risk-management calibrations 
quickly when company circumstances require an adjustment. In order to 
ensure that this is done in a fashion that accounts for the varying spectrums of 
risk perceptions, these are discussed regularly. This is explained below.
Managing the inter-dependence between risk 
perceptions and ERM alignment
Each year managers and selected employees fill in a risk profiling 
survey.  Those individuals reflect a range of working groups, including the 
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Executive team, the Security team, the Risk Management team, Sales 
teams, the Board of Directors, and others. An example of a question asked 
in the survey is:
Figure 1: Example results of risk  tolerance survey (Initials 
represent members of the executive team)
“I would accept a business proposition that has n% chance of doubling 
LeCroy's size, enterprise value, and EPS over a one year period, however it 
also carries a y% chance of bankrupting the company..”, with sets of [n,y] as 
follows:
[5%;95%], [25%;75%], [45%;55%], [50%;50%], [55%;45%], [75%;25], 
[95%;5%]
The results for the Executive Team members only are shown in Figure 1, 
on a 1-5 vertical scale (reflecting responses of strongly agree =1 ; strongly 
disagree = 5 on the questionnaire).  The lighter font traces are individual 
responses, with the firstname/lastname initials of the respondent.  Bolder 
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traces reflect the locus of key groups of managers and employees, including 
the security team and risk management team.  The arithmetically neutral risk 
agnostic trace is in orange, and the relative locus of this trace versus the others 
carries important insight into risk tolerance.
Whilst at first sight the exercise may look like an academic one, results 
are presented to various stakeholders (Executive Team, Board, Information 
Security Team and Risk Management Team) the resulting discussions are seen 
as an important and valuable mechanism to achieve a common understanding, 
and convergence. Each participant is given insight into their risk perception and 
tolerance characteristics as well as those of the other members of their work 
group, and of work groups adjacent in the value chain.  Providing this annual 
reminder of company vocabulary and methodology, is expected to drive 
enterprise risk management behaviour to converge over time toward 
alignment.  That has been the case each year between the first and second, 
and second and third, cycles.
Managing the influence of culture on alignment
In discussing risk culture, we have so far highlighted the potential 
tensions between the low tolerance of customer and employee related risks 
and the collegiate, knowledge sharing culture. We have also highlighted the 
high tolerance for market related risks. Further culture-related complexity 
arises out of the confluence of all these daily risk management activities.  Does 
each actor know what the overall enterprise risk objectives are at the time?  
Does each actor know the risk management practices of the other actors up 
and down the value chain to whom they hand off, or from whom they receive 
workflow?
One supporting action is an annual reminder to all members of the 
Security and Risk Management teams. An extract is shown in Figure 2.
2.0 Purpose
The purpose of this policy is to foster well-aligned decision-making 
throughout LeCroy, so that the levels of business risk embodied in the 
LeCroy information and physical infrastructure are managed to within 
tolerable limits at the lowest commensurate cost.
...             
4.0 Approach 
4.1 General 
Material risks should be:
o Anticipated: To the greatest extent possible. Responsible 
teams should periodically brainstorm 'what might go wrong', listing these 
areas out in writing.
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o Evaluated: An estimate, based on the best available data, of 
the probability of each type of event occurring, and of the likely 
consequences of that event should it occur, in $$ and where appropriate in 
injury terms, should be made.
o Considered: Possible mitigations and their costs should be 
explored, including an analysis of how much risk would remain after 
mitigation, and what the ROI of the potential mitigation would be.
o Addressed: Risk areas that are above tolerable levels should be 
continuously addressed to bring overall risk continuously lower.  Mitigation 
actions that offer the highest ROI should be considered most attractive.  
Each quarter a substantial number of risk mitigation actions must be 
completed (for FY05 H1 the required minimum number is 20 per quarter).
In general, risk areas with financial consequences are largely in the 
domain of LeCroy Information Systems Dept., while risk areas with safety 
consequences are in Facilities.
In general, the criteria for approving a proposed mitigation action, in 
an area where the risk is expressed in financial terms, is an ROI > 1.  
In general, the criteria for approving sets of mitigation action plans, 
where risks are expressed in safety terms, is the target of continuously 
reducing the total aggregated seriousness of threat to within acceptable 
levels, and by at least half each year.
4.2 Tolerable Risk
LeCroy's executive management team offers the following guidance 
to help you calibrate your risk-related decisions:
o LeCroy wishes to actively anticipate and mitigate risks where 
such actions are sound business management behaviour (ie 
ROI >1).  
o LeCroy sees itself as lowering pooled risks (ie insurance 
companies would view us as an attractive customer) due to 
proactive risk management.  LeCroy usually experiences lower 
than average insurance claims in a variety of areas, and has 
adjusted its insurance choices accordingly.
o Restating the two bullets above, LeCroy has a low tolerance for 
controllable risks (ie risks that could be profitably and 
proactively mitigated).
o LeCroy participates confidently in highly dynamic markets, and 
as such has a high tolerance for uncontrollable risks.  The 
executive staff rates LeCroy's uncontrollable risk tolerance at 
7.5 on a scale where 1 represents a staid organization such as 
a utility, and 10 represents a high-tech start up.  The staff also 
rates LeCroy's ideal tolerance for uncontrollable risk at 7.5.
Figure 2: Extract from the ERM Annual Reminder
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Each year the company conducts a Security Fair for all employees, up to 
and including the Board of Directors.  The fair is comprised of 5  8 booths, 
including at least one staffed by outside experts in the field.  Each employee 
must take a test and/or sign a declaration at the end, establishing metrics for the 
company as to the state of “education” of its “human firewall”.   The human 
firewall is a stated part of the overall defence-in-depth strategy, summarized in 
the Security Mission Statement (see Figure 3) that is posted prominently at the 
company.
LeCroy's most important assets are its employees and their 
knowledge. Protecting our assets preserves a competitive advantage and 
helps us achieve our goals.  Security risks introduced by individuals' 
decisions affects the entire LeCroy community, including visitors, vendors 
and customers.
It is the responsibility of everyone at LeCroy to use good judgment to 
continuously manage security risks in a manner consistent with our 
business mission and culture.  Alongside our security hardware, software 
and systems, the employees of LeCroy act as a human firewall to reduce 
the likelihood and extent of loss or harm.
Figure 3: Security Mission Statement
Top management further expresses its commitment to security by 
sponsoring an annual facilities survey that captures employee concerns about 
physical safety and security.  Investments such as upgraded outdoor lighting, 
traffic calming schemes, and security cameras have arisen from this process.
Contributions of this research
One reason organizations shy away from attempting to align risk 
perceptions, is their belief that such perceptions cannot be quantified and 
compared.  The approach presented here, quantifying magnitude of perceived 
risk in terms of “how much would you spend to halve the risk”, overcomes this 
obstacle and enables organizations to take the first steps.  
The understanding that “survival bets” present a different, non-
arithmetic, risk perception profile than “run of the mill bets” to executives, 
enables alignment in organizations.  Without this understanding, adjacent 
players in the execution chain might apply the usual arithmetic lens to risk 
management decisions in situations that require special treatment.
The paper has presented a specific and detailed methodology which 
readers could adapt and apply to a wide variety of organizations in order to 
elevate enterprise risk management practices.
Limitations of this research and potential for extensions
The case organization chosen had recently completed two acquisitions 
(Oct. 2004 and Oct. 2006), and integration of acquisitions, each with its own risk 
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culture, may have introduced effects not typical in a stable continuing 
organization.  
The case organization has an unusually long average length of 
employee service (LOS).  Furthermore, within the span of that average LOS, 
the case organization was engaged in the high-energy physics research 
market, one which is highly unusual in that it is centered in military and 
university settings.  These two settings traditionally have highly dissimilar 
information risk management cultures.  Therefore today's LeCroy organization 
may contain echoes of this earlier atypical confluence of risk cultures.
The case organization is unusual in other aspects that impact 
information security risk, including:
- a high proportion of revenue derived from non-domestic market sales 
for a SME
- high intellectual property content (ASICs for data acquisition and 
oscilloscope operating system)
- Windows-based embedded OS
- remote production (Tokyo and Penang) networks
Further investigation along these lines could be carried out in a larger 
and more complex organization, where the likelihood of larger discontinuities in 
risk perception alignment are greater.  Such an organization would provide 
fertile ground for investigating alignment methods which support a greater level 
of indirection, i.e. more links in the alignment chain.
Investigation over a greater period of time would certainly be more likely 
to capture effects of special circumstances.  For example, how external 
stresses such as those introduced by the business and economic cycle may 
impact risk perceptions.  Related longer term influences might be detected 
from sources such as election cycles, currency fluctuations, interest rate 
changes, and others.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the case study of LeCroy offers an illustration of the 
effective use of mixed formal and informal ERM culture alignment mechanisms, 
ranging from committee structures to security fairs, surveys, to spreadsheet 
tools.  The methodology is partly data-driven, partly a qualitative cycle of 
education and training. An interesting aspect of the methodology is that it 
encourages discussion to bring about a shared understanding of the appetite 
for risk of the organization. Recent work on aligning Information Assurance with 
business strategy (Birchall et al., 2004) has shown that an essential element of 
alignment is communication between the stakeholders and managers 
accountable for Information Assurance in the organisation. The case presented 
here suggests that this communication around risk and risk perceptions can be 
an important component of ensuring that alignment is achieved. This need for 
communication is implemented through a variety of mechanisms that 
encourage alignment (rather than prescribe it).
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The case also raises interesting questions about the link between 
Enterprise Risk Management and other forms of risk management in the 
company. At LeCroy, three committees have an important risk management 
function: the Executive Team, the Risk Management Committee and the 
Information Security Committee.   Because the Risk Management Committee 
and the Information Security Committee are at the same level this raises 
possibilities of duplication of business between the two committees and 
accountability. Furthermore, the recommendations of the two committees may 
potentially overlap. There is therefore the need for coordination  between them, 
as well as appropriate overseeing by the Executive Team. At LeCroy this is 
achieved by the role of the CIO (who is also a member of the Executive team). 
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